An immediate difficulty that arises with the position of Messianic Orthodoxy is that not only is belief in Yeshua as Mashiach considered to not be acceptable within traditional Judaism but it is thought to be fundamentally anathema, a heretical view of the level that excludes the believer from klal Yisrael, much less from Orthodox Judaism. This is one of the few areas where hashkafa plays itself out significantly in a practical, halachic way. The most direct and oft-referred to source on this matter is Rambam, both his 12th ikar and also in Hilchot Melachim 11-12.
Now, this discussion can quickly be confused for apologetics or a complete review and rebuttal of all rabbinic opposition to belief in Yeshua. However, my most primary concern is to deal with this difficulty as one in-house, where we are not seeking to convince but to create, to smooth and reconnect in a way that creates an integrity of thought, specifically for the hasid of Yeshua, in a way that would be done with other issues in Orthodox Judaism. Also, in the end this is just meant to be a taste of future work.
Rambam's 12th ikar declares perfect faith in the coming of Mashiach, "even though he tarry, I will await him." It is the 13 ikarim that are considered to be the most basic marker of participation in klal Yisrael and in receiving at least a minimal portion in the world to come. As we can see, there is very little in Rambam's statement that we could be said to be denying. It is only the application of this principle to other sources that creates a difficulty.
However, there is a greater distinction between these two types of discussion of Mashiach than this. The matter may be understood by examining it (chakira) using the Brisker method of distinguishing between chovat cheftza and chovat gavra. We may ask, what is the nature of belief in Mashiach? 1) Is it an obligation of the person to believe in the Mashiach (chovat gavra) or, 2) is there something of the Mashiach’s nature that requires that he be believed in (chovat cheftza)? We would initially respond, of course we are required to believe in him, that is what we are declaring in the twelfth principle. However, we must understand that both cases are possible but have their own function and demands.
Let us examine the first option by assigning this outlook to Rambam’s Hilchot Melachim. Certain outwardly recognizable actions and characteristics of Mashiach are described there. These features are like a switch, when they are present they activate various levels of requirements in the gavra, in the person. [Notice that this is not chovat cheftza because it is not Mashiach’s metaphysical reality that places a requirement upon the gavra but a series of situations that develop in time.] However, let us say that we have a case like that of R. Akiva, who believed that Bar Kochva was Mashiach, because he had demonstrated the characteristics of the first stage described in Hilchot Melachim. Though it had not reached the second level of certainty, certain responses were reasonable if not required. However, Bar Kochva was killed and R. Akiva realized from this that he was not Mashiach. What is interesting is that R. Akiva was required, or there was at least reasonable certainty that he was required, to respond to Bar Kochva in certain ways relegated for Mashiach. This demonstrates that one can be required to activate a type of belief in a person as Mashiach even when that person is not the Mashiach. Though there are certain safeguards in this system, such as the two levels of Mashiach, that prevent someone who is not Mashiach from being accorded that full status, this is evidently not the highest form of the two.
Now, this discussion can quickly be confused for apologetics or a complete review and rebuttal of all rabbinic opposition to belief in Yeshua. However, my most primary concern is to deal with this difficulty as one in-house, where we are not seeking to convince but to create, to smooth and reconnect in a way that creates an integrity of thought, specifically for the hasid of Yeshua, in a way that would be done with other issues in Orthodox Judaism. Also, in the end this is just meant to be a taste of future work.
Rambam's 12th ikar declares perfect faith in the coming of Mashiach, "even though he tarry, I will await him." It is the 13 ikarim that are considered to be the most basic marker of participation in klal Yisrael and in receiving at least a minimal portion in the world to come. As we can see, there is very little in Rambam's statement that we could be said to be denying. It is only the application of this principle to other sources that creates a difficulty.
However, there is a greater distinction between these two types of discussion of Mashiach than this. The matter may be understood by examining it (chakira) using the Brisker method of distinguishing between chovat cheftza and chovat gavra. We may ask, what is the nature of belief in Mashiach? 1) Is it an obligation of the person to believe in the Mashiach (chovat gavra) or, 2) is there something of the Mashiach’s nature that requires that he be believed in (chovat cheftza)? We would initially respond, of course we are required to believe in him, that is what we are declaring in the twelfth principle. However, we must understand that both cases are possible but have their own function and demands.
Let us examine the first option by assigning this outlook to Rambam’s Hilchot Melachim. Certain outwardly recognizable actions and characteristics of Mashiach are described there. These features are like a switch, when they are present they activate various levels of requirements in the gavra, in the person. [Notice that this is not chovat cheftza because it is not Mashiach’s metaphysical reality that places a requirement upon the gavra but a series of situations that develop in time.] However, let us say that we have a case like that of R. Akiva, who believed that Bar Kochva was Mashiach, because he had demonstrated the characteristics of the first stage described in Hilchot Melachim. Though it had not reached the second level of certainty, certain responses were reasonable if not required. However, Bar Kochva was killed and R. Akiva realized from this that he was not Mashiach. What is interesting is that R. Akiva was required, or there was at least reasonable certainty that he was required, to respond to Bar Kochva in certain ways relegated for Mashiach. This demonstrates that one can be required to activate a type of belief in a person as Mashiach even when that person is not the Mashiach. Though there are certain safeguards in this system, such as the two levels of Mashiach, that prevent someone who is not Mashiach from being accorded that full status, this is evidently not the highest form of the two.
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