The Shmita

The general consensus is that the most valid methods of obtaining produce are the Otzar Beit Din (which will provide tree fruit from within Israel), produce raised either outside the state of Israel or outside the area considered to have the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael (such as the Negev), and certain vegetables grown in pots (according to halachic standards, though we avoid the leniency to plant in pots during the seventh year) or through hydroponics. Produce of gentile owned land within Eretz Yisrael is also considered a possibility but is generally not viewed in a favorable light. Reasons for this include the possibility of poor health standards, political reasons, and the fact that though gentiles are not forbidden from agricultural work, the land is still not being rested.

We take the more stringent opinion that produce of gentile owned land in Eretz Yisrael has kedusha. Among other ramifications, this means that one who buys this produce from a gentile cannot turn around and resell, we would be unable to make use of a general wholesaler of this type of produce (outside a Va’adat Hashmita). We also take the more stringent opinions that commerce with produce from land that was guarded or worked is forbidden.

However, though we are stringent in areas that affect how the land is worked, this does not necessarily mean that we must be so in other areas. Since most of us are ba’alei teshuva this would probably be out of character for us. So, in matters of kedusha and biur we can make use of the lenient positions. A useful example of the lenient position in regards to the kedusha of produce would be to not consider water that shvi’it produce was cooked in as having kedusha, we may throw it out without waiting. We are also lenient on what are considered sefichin (i.e. mushrooms are not included).

The Shmita - Background

Though not motivated by anything specifically Messianic, there has been a common consensus of Orthodox believers I know regarding the laws of shvi’it. The general thrust of this consensus is that the reliance on the heter mechira does not seem an adequate way of observing the shmita year. This lead to an attempt to formalize the parameters of our observance of the shmita in a manner that properly describes this concern.

I have decided to first briefly outline some of the significant halachic elements of hilchot shvi’it since it is a lesser known area of halachah.

First and foremost is the prohibition on certain agricultural melachot. However, the oddity of the shmita is that on the one hand they are prohibited but on the other we are meant to take small amounts of wildly growing produce. This second part tempers the basic prohibition in certain ways.

There is also a rabbinic prohibition on sefichin, which is essentially everything but tree fruit (but also prohibiting grapes and olives). This prohibition was set in place in order to prevent people from secretly planting during the seventh year and then claiming it was a miracle. This prohibition is especially useful today in regards to harvesting grain. There is little difference between mass picking and individual picking of tree fruit but this is not true of harvesting grain. Without this prohibition we might be more tempted to harvest large amounts of grain improperly. Since this is a rabbinic prohibition there are limitations to it as well. The main practical one is for sefichin grown halachically in pots which are permissible during the shmita.

Produce of the seventh year also possesses kedusha. For this reason it must not be wasted or thrown away. It can also be cooked and prepared in certain ways that are not considered wasting it.

There is also a requirement to perform biur at various times throughout the seventh year. Biur is removal of produce at the end of its season from one’s property and declaring before three people that the produce is ownerless. Then anyone who wishes (including the original owner) may take the produce.

Commerce with produce of the seventh year is prohibited. Also, the land cannot be guarded. In other words, anyone should have access to whatever produce is growing on it.

The heter mechira essentially attempts to solve these problems by selling the land to gentiles. This method relies on several assumptions. The most fundamental assumption is that we are in a situation of pikuach nefesh. Though when the heter was originally conceived we could argue this was true, it is certainly not true today. Another assumption is that Israel is under a foreign government, which is also not true today. The produce of gentile land is also assumed to not have kedusha, therefore allowing otherwise prohibited work, which, as we will see later is not a universal position. For these reasons and more, the hareidim and even many from the Rabbinate have rejected or attempted to phase out the heter.

Another method is the Otzar Bet Din (storehouse of the court). This method only pertains to tree fruit, since there is a rabbinic prohibition on the remaining produce. Once tree fruit is picked with the proper shinui the greatest difficulties are the limited amount that can be picked by one person and selling it to the consumer. In this case, the beit din acts for the whole community (or as the whole community). The gatherers are the appointed agents of all the community, so they essentially bring us each our portion that we could have picked had we been in the orchard. Also, when the consumer buys the fruit he is just paying for the costs of production and the salary of the workers defrayed across the produce.

Bishul Akum - Gentile Cooking

There are essentially two explanations among the Rishonim for the prohibition of bishul akum (food cooked by a gentile). The first is that it is in order to avoid impurity (ochel tame), i.e. non-kosher cooking. The other more popular explanation is that the prohibition is to avoid intermarriage (mishum chatanut). The intermarriage targeted by the prohibition is not just of the immediate kind, in other words, if there were no specific personal chance of intermarriage the prohibition still applies.

Because of this prohibition, usually a Jewish person has to be involved in the cooking process as well. This is usually done by at least lighting the fire, etc. (There are a few kinds of food that are exempted from this requirement). This creates a unique situation in which it becomes quite difficult to eat with our fellow gentile believers in their homes, no matter how strictly they keep the laws of kashrut. In addition, the primary reason for doing this is in order to avoid becoming too friendly with them. This social barrier is quite similar to the one that Kefa was instructed to overcome in Acts 10. He wasn’t asked to eat non-kosher food but to eat with those who until now were considered non-kosher to eat with.

However, there is a certain amount of truth to each explanation. Both the concern for eating non-kosher food and the desire to avoid becoming too friendly with the general gentile world are valid ones. We often assume gentile means “believer” and that it is perfectly safe to relate to all gentiles. However, originally it had more of the connotation of “non-believer”. Also, the right balance of contact with the other and of strengthening one’s calling by interaction with the same (the Jewish world) needs to be struck to avoid assimilation, not just in marriage but in loss of Torah observance.

The immediate concern for avoiding transgressing Torah mitzvot (i.e. kashrut) as found in the first explanation is always valid. However, sometimes long-term preventative measures implemented to avoid intermarriage may be overridden by other concerns. The overriding principle in this case involves the unity of “the body of Mashiach”. Often this overriding principle is mistaken in its application. It is often assumed that the mitzvot are overridden for the sake of this unity, instead of the true application which is that the distance between people groups is overridden (when it does not threaten the mitzvot) for the sake of unity.

This overriding principle also does not truly override the prohibition of bishul akum. What it essentially does is allows us to rule leniently according to the first opinion. When the guidelines of the unity of the body do not apply, then we revert to the standard explanation. For example, commercially produced products will still be required to follow the standard halachot whether owned by believers or not.

Now, in order to fulfill this principle it is not always necessary to technically negate the second reason of chatanut. In the case of gentiles who are fully knowledgeable of kashrut and whose integrity can be trusted, the reason of ochel tame is not valid. In addition, since they are quite observant, there is very little true difficulty of chatanut since they may easily be converted at any time. (Note, however, that we are overriding the universal application of the principle of chatanut and only applying it locally). Only because of our unique history, whether that be lack of a conversion process or difficulty going through standard giur programs, do we even posses the anomaly of these kinds of gentiles.

However, there are certain times where it might be necessary to rule leniently according to the ochel tame example because of this principle. In that case, as long as supervision sufficient to provide kosher food is provided, the food itself should not be prohibited.

However, there are several caveats. 1) This should only be done within the limited confines of community fellowship (therefore, even Christian owned food businesses must still keep bishul akum laws) and occasionally also within the wider community. 2) There should be almost no reason to permit in the case of non-believing gentiles. The only exception might be within outreach, or to honor certain individuals or family members. 3) Even in these cases, the supervision required would be thorough enough that it is not that difficult to then do what is needed to be involved in the cooking process. This should almost always be done. However, b'di'eved, their food is acceptable.

The Shabbos Goy

The laws regarding amirat akum (statement made to a gentile regarding work on Shabbat) are often not well understood and observed in some orthodox circles. Often requests that are not truly permissible are made of gentiles on Shabbat. This presents a poor image of the limits of what can be requested (even in hinting) or received from a gentile on Shabbat. Also, the introduction of electrical appliances sometimes now permits an action that would not have been permitted beforehand. For example, asking a gentile to light a candle would have been prohibited. However, today we can hint about flipping of the lights (in certain conditions) since it is only a prohibition d’rabanan.

Even though this issue is not directly dealt with in the New Testament, we do have the difficulty of applying the new reality of gentiles described for us there into practice. On the one hand, gentile followers of Yeshua are still not required to observe Shabbat, so we could say that this area of halachah is fully operative for us. On the other, they are full members of our communities, and we would not wish to create two classes within our communities. Though there will be variety, this should not be made into a demeaning thing. Also, many of us feel, at least at a certain level, that this sends a bad message about our observance, that we will only be able to observe if we employ others to break the Shabbat for us. We have the additional problem of many gentiles among us who, if otherwise given the opportunity, would have been converted by now. Asking people in this situation to perform melachot for us would only serve to put salt in their wounds, wounds that are largely the product of being a believer (i.e. less access to the conversion process either because we do not have our own or because they are not converted because of their belief in Yeshua etc.).

However, we must also remember the reverse side of this issue. There are two main sub-categories in relation to the Shabbos Goy, amirat akum, the actual request or hint to a gentile, and also the issue of whether we may benefit from the melachot of a gentile, regardless of whether we asked for them to be performed. Though we have seen some of the difficulties of making use of the amirat akum above, if we were to wipe out the whole category of halachot regarding the Shabbos Goy, we would have to spend undue effort to avoid the results of melachot performed by a gentile. This could easily lead to curtailing their freedom as a gentile to perform such melachot, essentially rejecting their unique calling. Also, if we were to categorically reject these halachot, then in a minor emergency one would not be allowed to avail themselves of the help of those who are allowed to help.

Instead, I propose that we as believers in Yeshua, those who are aware of the new status of the gentiles who follow him, limit our freedom to utilize the amirat akum. This limitation is voluntary, but should be generally done by all believers, considering their common beliefs on this issue. This solution is beneficial in that it does not limit the freedom of gentiles to perform melachot and still allows us to benefit from their actions where appropriate. However, this ability to benefit should largely only be made use of so that their freedom does not impinge on ours or in emergency situations (specifically medical). Also, this still leaves us the ability to utilize the amirat akum in cases of medical emergency. This proposal also has the added benefit of not condemning those who do make use of the laws of amirat akum in the wider Jewish world.

Rambam's Mashiach and the Brisker Derech: Note

In Hilchot Melachim, Rambam lists Yeshua’s “death” as a disqualifying factor. However his “death”is not a terminal criteria, since he is still alive. This was only a deduction of Rambam’s, which can be proved by the following. 1) Rambam essentially did not believe in supernatural (non-natural) means, so resurrection is not a likely scenario. This viewpoint of his is an area of dispute, not part of the universal core of the 13 ikkarim but just a part of his individual position. 2) It is obvious that Rambam based himself on the example of R. Akiva, since Bar Kochva’s death there is also operative in R. Akiva’s reversal of opinion. There is also no direct Talmudic source that states this rule. Therefore, he must have drawn a generally good conclusion from the account, but this does not make for a universal law.

Rambam's Mashiach and the Brisker Derech: 2

Now, what if instead we said that the Mashiach should be viewed through the principle of chovat cheftza instead? This would mean that there is something in Mashiach’s personhood or being that should trigger our response to him. However, at least according to the example in Hilchot Melachim, chovat cheftza is not appropriate. On the other hand, the 13 ikarim could be understood through this mechanism. Ideally, it is not just a mental concept about God and his character that is being examined in the 13 ikarim, the true Jew will have these concepts as a part of their inner being. Therefore, even if they might be mentally confused on some intricate theological point, the true test will be when they are confronted by the reality of the Almighty. Does their ultimate metaphysical reality leap towards or away from this meeting? Are they inwardly compatible with the world to come?

This also explains why the 13 ikarim are used as a measuring stick for minimal acceptance in the world to come. If they are in their core meant to be a measurement of the individual’s response to the true, ultimate metaphysical realities beyond each ikar, then they are essentially a judgment of our own metaphysical makeup. They move from just an outward list of ideas that are to be verbally expressed and become a description of the basic internal things that will be examined by the Eternal Judge. Do we truly cleave to the divine in all of these areas?

So, a recap of the differences between my view of the chovat gavra of Hilchot Melachim and the chovat cheftza of the 13 ikarim is as follows. In the first case, there is the possibility that one may have to partially act like someone is Mashiach even when they are not. Certain halachic responses are triggered, certain authority to act physically is granted in a graduated manner, depending on the evidence. Conversely, if the cheftza of Mashiach is truly encountered, it may trigger a response deserving of Mashiach even though he has not yet fulfilled the criteria. At the same time, we are not granted halachic permission to perform certain actions for Yeshua that are reserved for Mashiach. This would be the case, even if someone else (k’v’yachol) was Mashiach but had not yet performed the required criteria. However, this limitation is also appropriate to our view of Yeshua. The actions we are talking about largely involve wars and national actions, all of which we believe are held for his return.

Therefore, though he is not yet the “Mashiach” of Rambam’s Hilchot Melachim, he may still be the Mashiach. If we truly encounter his metaphysical reality, nothing less than the belief in him as Mashiach should be expected. We may not yet be justified in triggering the responses that should be set off by the criteria of Hilchot Melachim, but we could not be said to posses the essence that the 13 ikarim are meant to express if we denied that he is Mashiach. One who has not had this encounter has only the halachic criteria on which to rely, so it would not be very logical for them to accept Yeshua. However, one who does posses the higher criteria of the 12 ikkar, cannot reverse his position based on the less effective measurement of chovat gavra.

I hope that I have presented a possible way of describing how it is halachically permitted (in a very narrow example, obviously) to believe that Yeshua is Mashiach. Actually, if one has received this metaphysical revelation (either directly or through tradition) then it could even be argued that they are not allowed to go back on this viewpoint. Also, the exclusionary power of the 13 ikarim regarding us has been dealt with (at least regarding the 12^th ikar). This is an even more essential point at this stage since the discussion regarding belief in Yeshua must take place within Judaism, and we cannot do that, obviously, if it is anathema to hold the discussion in the first place.