A Slichot Prayer to Yeshua

While praying the slichot this year, I remembered a little practice I began last year at this time. This isn’t really a teshuva or anything like that, just more of a personal minhag for anyone who finds it useful.

During the nefilat apayim section of slichot, there is a passage entitled machnisei rachamim, which requests angels or other heavenly intermediaries to deliver our prayers before God. The permissibility of using such intermediaries and addressing them in prayer is an area of halachic debate. However, one way or another, the prayer is still there.

Though I don’t think that anything in the prayer itself requires it to be changed, I certainly see in it a good opportunity to introduce prayer relating to Yeshua. This can be done simply enough by changing the plural terms addressing the intermediaries to singular (which is more extensive in Hebrew than in the English). An English version of this altered prayer is as follows [adapted from “The Complete Artscroll Selichos” (Minhag Lita), the first example can be found on pp. 46-7]:

O you who ushers in [pleas for] mercy, may you usher in our [plea for] mercy, before the Master of mercy. O you who cause prayer to be heard, may you cause our prayer to be heard, before the Hearer of prayer. O you who cause outcry to be heard, may you cause our outcry to be heard, before the Hearer of outcry. O you who usher in tears, may you usher in our tears, before the King Who finds favor through tears.

Exert yourself, and multiply supplication and petition, before the King, God, exalted and most high. Mention before Him, cause to be heard before Him, the Torah and good deeds of [the Patriarchs and Matriarchs] who dwelt in the dust.

May He remember their love and grant life to [their] offspring, that the remnant of Jacob not be lost. For the flock of the faithful shepherd [Moses] has become a disgrace; Israel, the unique nation, a parable and a simile.

Speedily answer us, O God of our salvation, and redeem us from all harsh decrees; and may You save, in your abundant mercy, Your righteous anointed and Your people.

Shanah Tovah and Chatimah Tovah

Is all of God not corporeal or is Yeshua just not incorporeal?

“I believe with complete faith that the Creator, Blessed is His Name is not physical and is not affected by physical phenomena, and that there is no comparison whatsoever to Him.” 3^rd Ikar

It is actually Rambam’s 3^rd ikar and not the 12^th that has proven most difficult for Messianic believers to explain. Exactly describing Yeshua’s make-up in relation to humanity and God has often proven difficult, even within Christian circles. The nuances can often be quite significant since we are discussing the very nature of God. This point is extremely important to remember, that even within a specific religious group, the theological or philosophical tools used to describe these metaphysics are not perfect. Their results are often also unstable. The theological results of one era may be overturned or refined by another. This can often be a difficult foundation on which to build fundamental pillars and, worse, is a very tricky arena for dialogue between groups when a polemic motivation is involved.

The method of via negativa (attempt to define God by what may not be said about him) dominates when it comes to defining who or what is God and who or what is humanity. These two entities are often defined by saying that they are not the other. Even though God may be said to not be all of creation, humanity is often the other against which he is negatively defined. The compliment is then returned by humanity as well. This creates the unique problem of discussing the interaction between these two entities. This difficulty exists on many levels. How do we describe the human encounter with the divine that results in anthropomorphic descriptions, for, one way or another, our descriptions will be based on something that is familiar and coherent to us and can never be fully not us. The question really is, “What lies between the two?” Our tool of via negativa is not fully equipped for this question.

What I would like to propose regarding this ikar is not the Messianic solution, but an answer that technically provides leeway for further interaction. There is a point where exploration of theological matters leaves the basics and has more in common with the intricacies of maasei merkava and maase bereshit. To have some overall understanding of who God is and how I should view him is a must. However, beyond this basic point we run the risk of entering two less certain, exploratory areas and confusing their in-capturable nature with this basic view. First, we may confuse our theological tools, which are a sort of theoretical physics that attempts to describe or hypothesize regarding the experienced nature of God and the world, with the simple building blocks of absolute certainty. Secondly, we may confuse the generally knowable with the less attainable exploration of God’s nature that is more the realm of maase bereshit and maase merkava. I don’t necessarily mean that it is just a realm of mysticism so much as to show the totally contrasting characters of the two. On the one hand, principles should be generally known and accepted, readily accessible and meant to be accessed. On the other, there is another knowledge of God and the world that is meant to be the exact opposite, almost unattainable and certainly not considered a fundamental requirement for faith.

It is important to not confuse the need to adhere to the 13 ikarim with an in depth debate of more esoterical matters. These can of course be explored but may not have to be fully worked out initially just in order to “qualify”, so to speak. As we can see, Rambam describes God here in a fully via negativa sense. Now, we would certainly agree that God, or some element of him is above and beyond all limitedness, that he is transcendent. However, not only believers in Yeshua but most of Judaism to varying degrees also believes in interaction with the divine and imminence as well. Rambam is known for his extremely removed view of God. So, at least to some extent, this ikar has to be explained by most adherents of Judaism, kabbalistic outlooks are the most prominent in this regard.

I suggest that minimally we make use of the via negativa method on a new level. We can minimally state that the God defined by Rambam is certainly not physical. Whether this is all that there is to God or to the heavenly powers is another question. In some sense, it could be said that the panentheistic God of the sefirot has, in some part, a connection with the physical. However, that system reserves the characteristics described in this ikar for the Ein Sof. More specifically, we can say with certainty that Yeshua is certainly not the “Ein Sof” as described in Rambam’s 3^rd ikar. We are taking the same assumption, to belabour the analogy, that kabbalah does regarding “God” as described in Rambam’s ikar.

However, this position must not be misunderstood as license to abandon a proper understanding of Yeshua’s nature. Essentially, since we are forced to use a definition of God that we could say is minimalist enough to be agreed upon by all, we must remember the limitations of this ikar even within Judaism. I can technically make statements regarding God that do not purposefully match with this ikar as long as I reserve some element that does match up. The ikar’s purpose could be said to be to preserve the important, universally agreed upon element of God’s nature that even the common person should affirm. However, it still leaves open the debate (especially in the way it has sometimes been historically treated) regarding the interaction between this transcendent God and humanity.

[Note: Even though I made an analogy with Kabbalah, I do not mean to suggest that the sefirotic systems needs to or should be incorporated. My comparison is between two systems. If system A is allowed to accomplish a certain result, so too should system B be allowed the same leeway.]

The Shmita

The general consensus is that the most valid methods of obtaining produce are the Otzar Beit Din (which will provide tree fruit from within Israel), produce raised either outside the state of Israel or outside the area considered to have the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael (such as the Negev), and certain vegetables grown in pots (according to halachic standards, though we avoid the leniency to plant in pots during the seventh year) or through hydroponics. Produce of gentile owned land within Eretz Yisrael is also considered a possibility but is generally not viewed in a favorable light. Reasons for this include the possibility of poor health standards, political reasons, and the fact that though gentiles are not forbidden from agricultural work, the land is still not being rested.

We take the more stringent opinion that produce of gentile owned land in Eretz Yisrael has kedusha. Among other ramifications, this means that one who buys this produce from a gentile cannot turn around and resell, we would be unable to make use of a general wholesaler of this type of produce (outside a Va’adat Hashmita). We also take the more stringent opinions that commerce with produce from land that was guarded or worked is forbidden.

However, though we are stringent in areas that affect how the land is worked, this does not necessarily mean that we must be so in other areas. Since most of us are ba’alei teshuva this would probably be out of character for us. So, in matters of kedusha and biur we can make use of the lenient positions. A useful example of the lenient position in regards to the kedusha of produce would be to not consider water that shvi’it produce was cooked in as having kedusha, we may throw it out without waiting. We are also lenient on what are considered sefichin (i.e. mushrooms are not included).

The Shmita - Background

Though not motivated by anything specifically Messianic, there has been a common consensus of Orthodox believers I know regarding the laws of shvi’it. The general thrust of this consensus is that the reliance on the heter mechira does not seem an adequate way of observing the shmita year. This lead to an attempt to formalize the parameters of our observance of the shmita in a manner that properly describes this concern.

I have decided to first briefly outline some of the significant halachic elements of hilchot shvi’it since it is a lesser known area of halachah.

First and foremost is the prohibition on certain agricultural melachot. However, the oddity of the shmita is that on the one hand they are prohibited but on the other we are meant to take small amounts of wildly growing produce. This second part tempers the basic prohibition in certain ways.

There is also a rabbinic prohibition on sefichin, which is essentially everything but tree fruit (but also prohibiting grapes and olives). This prohibition was set in place in order to prevent people from secretly planting during the seventh year and then claiming it was a miracle. This prohibition is especially useful today in regards to harvesting grain. There is little difference between mass picking and individual picking of tree fruit but this is not true of harvesting grain. Without this prohibition we might be more tempted to harvest large amounts of grain improperly. Since this is a rabbinic prohibition there are limitations to it as well. The main practical one is for sefichin grown halachically in pots which are permissible during the shmita.

Produce of the seventh year also possesses kedusha. For this reason it must not be wasted or thrown away. It can also be cooked and prepared in certain ways that are not considered wasting it.

There is also a requirement to perform biur at various times throughout the seventh year. Biur is removal of produce at the end of its season from one’s property and declaring before three people that the produce is ownerless. Then anyone who wishes (including the original owner) may take the produce.

Commerce with produce of the seventh year is prohibited. Also, the land cannot be guarded. In other words, anyone should have access to whatever produce is growing on it.

The heter mechira essentially attempts to solve these problems by selling the land to gentiles. This method relies on several assumptions. The most fundamental assumption is that we are in a situation of pikuach nefesh. Though when the heter was originally conceived we could argue this was true, it is certainly not true today. Another assumption is that Israel is under a foreign government, which is also not true today. The produce of gentile land is also assumed to not have kedusha, therefore allowing otherwise prohibited work, which, as we will see later is not a universal position. For these reasons and more, the hareidim and even many from the Rabbinate have rejected or attempted to phase out the heter.

Another method is the Otzar Bet Din (storehouse of the court). This method only pertains to tree fruit, since there is a rabbinic prohibition on the remaining produce. Once tree fruit is picked with the proper shinui the greatest difficulties are the limited amount that can be picked by one person and selling it to the consumer. In this case, the beit din acts for the whole community (or as the whole community). The gatherers are the appointed agents of all the community, so they essentially bring us each our portion that we could have picked had we been in the orchard. Also, when the consumer buys the fruit he is just paying for the costs of production and the salary of the workers defrayed across the produce.

Bishul Akum - Gentile Cooking

There are essentially two explanations among the Rishonim for the prohibition of bishul akum (food cooked by a gentile). The first is that it is in order to avoid impurity (ochel tame), i.e. non-kosher cooking. The other more popular explanation is that the prohibition is to avoid intermarriage (mishum chatanut). The intermarriage targeted by the prohibition is not just of the immediate kind, in other words, if there were no specific personal chance of intermarriage the prohibition still applies.

Because of this prohibition, usually a Jewish person has to be involved in the cooking process as well. This is usually done by at least lighting the fire, etc. (There are a few kinds of food that are exempted from this requirement). This creates a unique situation in which it becomes quite difficult to eat with our fellow gentile believers in their homes, no matter how strictly they keep the laws of kashrut. In addition, the primary reason for doing this is in order to avoid becoming too friendly with them. This social barrier is quite similar to the one that Kefa was instructed to overcome in Acts 10. He wasn’t asked to eat non-kosher food but to eat with those who until now were considered non-kosher to eat with.

However, there is a certain amount of truth to each explanation. Both the concern for eating non-kosher food and the desire to avoid becoming too friendly with the general gentile world are valid ones. We often assume gentile means “believer” and that it is perfectly safe to relate to all gentiles. However, originally it had more of the connotation of “non-believer”. Also, the right balance of contact with the other and of strengthening one’s calling by interaction with the same (the Jewish world) needs to be struck to avoid assimilation, not just in marriage but in loss of Torah observance.

The immediate concern for avoiding transgressing Torah mitzvot (i.e. kashrut) as found in the first explanation is always valid. However, sometimes long-term preventative measures implemented to avoid intermarriage may be overridden by other concerns. The overriding principle in this case involves the unity of “the body of Mashiach”. Often this overriding principle is mistaken in its application. It is often assumed that the mitzvot are overridden for the sake of this unity, instead of the true application which is that the distance between people groups is overridden (when it does not threaten the mitzvot) for the sake of unity.

This overriding principle also does not truly override the prohibition of bishul akum. What it essentially does is allows us to rule leniently according to the first opinion. When the guidelines of the unity of the body do not apply, then we revert to the standard explanation. For example, commercially produced products will still be required to follow the standard halachot whether owned by believers or not.

Now, in order to fulfill this principle it is not always necessary to technically negate the second reason of chatanut. In the case of gentiles who are fully knowledgeable of kashrut and whose integrity can be trusted, the reason of ochel tame is not valid. In addition, since they are quite observant, there is very little true difficulty of chatanut since they may easily be converted at any time. (Note, however, that we are overriding the universal application of the principle of chatanut and only applying it locally). Only because of our unique history, whether that be lack of a conversion process or difficulty going through standard giur programs, do we even posses the anomaly of these kinds of gentiles.

However, there are certain times where it might be necessary to rule leniently according to the ochel tame example because of this principle. In that case, as long as supervision sufficient to provide kosher food is provided, the food itself should not be prohibited.

However, there are several caveats. 1) This should only be done within the limited confines of community fellowship (therefore, even Christian owned food businesses must still keep bishul akum laws) and occasionally also within the wider community. 2) There should be almost no reason to permit in the case of non-believing gentiles. The only exception might be within outreach, or to honor certain individuals or family members. 3) Even in these cases, the supervision required would be thorough enough that it is not that difficult to then do what is needed to be involved in the cooking process. This should almost always be done. However, b'di'eved, their food is acceptable.

The Shabbos Goy

The laws regarding amirat akum (statement made to a gentile regarding work on Shabbat) are often not well understood and observed in some orthodox circles. Often requests that are not truly permissible are made of gentiles on Shabbat. This presents a poor image of the limits of what can be requested (even in hinting) or received from a gentile on Shabbat. Also, the introduction of electrical appliances sometimes now permits an action that would not have been permitted beforehand. For example, asking a gentile to light a candle would have been prohibited. However, today we can hint about flipping of the lights (in certain conditions) since it is only a prohibition d’rabanan.

Even though this issue is not directly dealt with in the New Testament, we do have the difficulty of applying the new reality of gentiles described for us there into practice. On the one hand, gentile followers of Yeshua are still not required to observe Shabbat, so we could say that this area of halachah is fully operative for us. On the other, they are full members of our communities, and we would not wish to create two classes within our communities. Though there will be variety, this should not be made into a demeaning thing. Also, many of us feel, at least at a certain level, that this sends a bad message about our observance, that we will only be able to observe if we employ others to break the Shabbat for us. We have the additional problem of many gentiles among us who, if otherwise given the opportunity, would have been converted by now. Asking people in this situation to perform melachot for us would only serve to put salt in their wounds, wounds that are largely the product of being a believer (i.e. less access to the conversion process either because we do not have our own or because they are not converted because of their belief in Yeshua etc.).

However, we must also remember the reverse side of this issue. There are two main sub-categories in relation to the Shabbos Goy, amirat akum, the actual request or hint to a gentile, and also the issue of whether we may benefit from the melachot of a gentile, regardless of whether we asked for them to be performed. Though we have seen some of the difficulties of making use of the amirat akum above, if we were to wipe out the whole category of halachot regarding the Shabbos Goy, we would have to spend undue effort to avoid the results of melachot performed by a gentile. This could easily lead to curtailing their freedom as a gentile to perform such melachot, essentially rejecting their unique calling. Also, if we were to categorically reject these halachot, then in a minor emergency one would not be allowed to avail themselves of the help of those who are allowed to help.

Instead, I propose that we as believers in Yeshua, those who are aware of the new status of the gentiles who follow him, limit our freedom to utilize the amirat akum. This limitation is voluntary, but should be generally done by all believers, considering their common beliefs on this issue. This solution is beneficial in that it does not limit the freedom of gentiles to perform melachot and still allows us to benefit from their actions where appropriate. However, this ability to benefit should largely only be made use of so that their freedom does not impinge on ours or in emergency situations (specifically medical). Also, this still leaves us the ability to utilize the amirat akum in cases of medical emergency. This proposal also has the added benefit of not condemning those who do make use of the laws of amirat akum in the wider Jewish world.

Rambam's Mashiach and the Brisker Derech: Note

In Hilchot Melachim, Rambam lists Yeshua’s “death” as a disqualifying factor. However his “death”is not a terminal criteria, since he is still alive. This was only a deduction of Rambam’s, which can be proved by the following. 1) Rambam essentially did not believe in supernatural (non-natural) means, so resurrection is not a likely scenario. This viewpoint of his is an area of dispute, not part of the universal core of the 13 ikkarim but just a part of his individual position. 2) It is obvious that Rambam based himself on the example of R. Akiva, since Bar Kochva’s death there is also operative in R. Akiva’s reversal of opinion. There is also no direct Talmudic source that states this rule. Therefore, he must have drawn a generally good conclusion from the account, but this does not make for a universal law.